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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of firm and country reputation on exports
when buyers cannot observe quality prior to purchase. Firm-level demand
is determined by expected quality, which is driven by the dynamics of con-
sumer learning through experience and the country of origin’s reputation
for quality. We show that asymmetric information can result in multiple
steady-state equilibria with endogenous reputation. We identify two types
of steady states: a high-quality equilibrium (HQE) and a low-quality equi-
librium (LQE). In a LQE, only the lowest-quality and the highest-quality
firms are active; a range of relatively high-quality firms are permanently kept
out of the market by the informational friction. Countries with bad qual-
ity reputation can therefore be locked into exporting low-quality, low-cost
goods. Our model delivers novel insights about the dynamic impact of trade
policies. First, an export subsidy increases the steady-state average quality
of exports and welfare in a LQE, but decreases both quality and welfare
in a HQE. Second, there is a tax/subsidy scheme based on the duration of
export experience that replicates the perfect information outcome. Third, a
minimum quality standard can help an economy initially in a LQE moving
to a HQE.
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1. Introduction
Why do country-of-origin labels matter to consumers? This question finds
no clear answer in standard models of international trade, which assume
that consumers are perfectly informed about the characteristics of every
available product and leave no role for country reputations. However, as a
large literature on experience goods has shown, quality is not fully known to
consumers prior to purchase for a wide range of goods. Inferring the quality
of a good requires time and is achieved both through search and through
experience. For these categories of goods, country-of-origin affects product
evaluations and consumers’ decisions.1
In this paper, we argue that a “national brand image” matters because
it provides an anchor for the expected unobservable quality of imports such
that a bad country reputation can become self-fulfilling. Consumption de-
cisions, in practice, are based on a limited information set available to con-
sumers at the time of purchase: information gathered as a result of past
consumption experience and word-of-mouth diffusion, but also the country
where the good was manufactured. For new and unknown foreign goods, the
main piece of information available to consumers besides observable charac-
teristics is the “made in” label, which indicates the country of manufacturing
and creates a key role for national reputations. We call “national reputa-
tion” the common component of consumers’ expectations of the quality of
goods produced within a given country. Country reputations determine the
quality that buyers expect before they learn any information specific to a
product. We show how the dynamics of consumer learning and country
reputation can create multiple equilibria with self-fulfilling expectations.
More specifically, we consider an infinite-horizon two-country model with
a continuum of potential foreign exporters heterogeneous in quality, and a
constant flow of new potential exporters per period. Each new firm draws
a quality parameter from a fixed distribution of firm technologies and has
the option to produce a good of this quality. The decision to produce is
endogenous: potential foreign exporters decide whether to enter the market
and when to exit, taking into account the impact of their decisions on ex-
pected future sales. We assume that the cost of producing one physical unit
1Schott (2008) documents that the prices that US consumers are willing to pay for
Chinese exports are substantially lower than the prices they are willing to pay for OECD
exports of the same products. Many survey-based studies in the marketing literature,
summarized by Roth and Diamantopoulos (2009) also emphasize the role of country-of-
origin labels in setting consumer perceptions of quality.
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of the good is monotonically increasing in quality, but the cost per quality-
adjusted unit is decreasing in quality. Quality is known to firms but not
observed by consumers before purchase. Hence, import demand depends
on perceived quality, which has two components. Goods imported from a
given country are first evaluated according to a country-wide prior, which
is endogenously determined by the average quality of the country’s exports
in a long-run industry equilibrium. Importers then learn about the true
quality of firms that have exported in the past. The fraction of informed
consumers increases with the time a firm has been active on the market. The
effect of the country prior will thus prevail for new exporters and fade over
time as buyers gain familiarity with individual foreign brands. As a con-
sequence, asymmetric information fosters entry by low-quality firms, which
earn higher profits than under perfect information by free-riding on high-
quality expectations. It depresses profits of the highest-quality firms, forced
to incur initial losses in order to reveal information about their type.
We characterize the equilibrium structure. There are two types of steady
states with endogenous reputation: a high-quality, high-reputation equi-
librium (HQE), and a low-quality, low-reputation equilibrium (LQE). In
a LQE, only the lowest-quality and the highest-quality firms are active; a
range of relatively high-quality firms are permanently kept out of the market
by the informational friction. Fly-by-night firms export only for one period
in this equilibrium; on the contrary, in a HQE, low-quality firms that enter
intially as fly-by-nights can last longer than one period. We show that there
can be multiple equilibria, such that countries with bad quality reputation
can be locked into exporting low-quality, low-cost goods. Where multiple
equilibria exist, reputation shocks can then have self-fulfilling effects.
This last result challenges the effectiveness of some export-led growth
strategies which rely on exporting low-quality, low-cost goods and gradually
moving up to higher quality, higher unit-value goods. A number of East
Asian economies have pursued such strategies in the past. Without policy
intervention, we show that it may not be a feasible path if the economy is
trapped in a self-fulfilling equilibrium in which the country’s reputation for
low quality prevents some high-quality firms from entering export markets.
We therefore consider various policies that can be implemented in a low-
quality equilibrium to promote exports and improve a country’s reputation
abroad.
Our model delivers novel insights about the impact of the following trade
policies. First, an export subsidy increases the steady-state average quality
of exports and welfare of the exporting country in a LQE, but decreases
both quality and welfare in a HQE. This policy raises the incentives to
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export for all firms, but in a LQE it has a larger effect on high-quality firms
which have a longer effective horizon. Conversely, in a HQE, it only leads to
additional entry by low-quality firms, which creates a negative reputation
externality on all exporters. Second, there is a tax and subsidy scheme based
on the duration of export experience that replicates the perfect information
outcome. Finally, a minimum quality standard can help an economy initially
in a LQE move to a HQE.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature relevant to the present study. Section 3 lays out our modelling
framework. Section 4 analyzes high-quality and low-quality steady-state
equilibria with endogenous reputation. Section 5 explores the effects of
different policy instruments on quality, reputation and welfare. Section 6
concludes.
2. Related Literature
This paper relates to the international trade and industrial organization
literature on vertical quality differentiation and asymmetric information.
This section briefly explains how our dynamic approach with a continuum
of quality types and self-fulfilling reputations differs from the existing models
of asymmetric information in exports.
Informational barriers to entry in international trade have been studied
by Mayer (1984), Grossman and Horn (1988), Bagwell and Staiger (1989),
Bagwell (1991), Chen (1991), Dasgupta and Mondria (2012, 2013) and
Chisik (2003). Mayer (1984) was the first to investigate export subsidies
in the presence of initially uninformed consumers but did so without model-
ing explicitly the process of consumer learning and expectations formation,
and relied on pessimistic consumer beliefs. Dasgupta and Mondria (2013)
develop a two-period model with similar features to ours, where the quality
of new exporters is unobservable and that of continuing exporters is known
by a fraction of consumers. They, however, focus on the role of interme-
diaries in providing quality assurance and do not analyze the formation of
country reputations.
The articles that are the most closely related to the present paper are
Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and Chisik (2003) who both explore the inter-
play between country reputation, exporting firm quality and optimal trade
policy. While our paper builds on these pioneering works, it departs from
them both in the assumptions and in the policy implications. In our model,
exporting firms cannot signal their quality, so that information acquisition
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is entirely driven by the dynamics of consumer learning through experience
and the evolution of country reputations. We also introduce a richer qual-
ity structure with a continuum of quality types rather than only two types;
and a richer time structure with an infinite horizon model, while Bagwell
and Staiger (1989) use a two-period model and Chisik (2003) considers a
static game. We are then able to model the process of reputation formation
and investigate the transition dynamics of quality and reputation between
steady states, between an uninformed prior and the steady state, or following
shocks.
In contrast to the existing literature, we obtain two distinct regimes
(HQE and LQE). In the LQE regime, non-exporters are in the middle of the
quality distribution, while the lowest-quality firms and the highest-quality
firms are not precluded from entering the market. While Grossman (1990)
has anticipated the hollowing out of the middle of the quality distribution,
our paper is the first to formalize these results.2
Note moreover that our paper is one of the very few that focus on
country-of-origin reputations rather than on pure informational barriers to
entry. Together with Chisik (2003) and Dasgupta and Mondria (2012) we
are the first to model self-fulfilling country reputations – and we improve
on these previous works by introducing a dynamic model with a more full-
fledged quality dimension. Country-of-origin reputations are certainly re-
lated to the topic of exporters of an unknown quality, but also encompass
a different set of issues. In particular, their policy implications can depart
from those of informational asymmetries as a policy goal is to push the econ-
omy on a path to a different, higher welfare equilibrium. In that respect,
our modeling of country-of-origin reputations is related in spirit to the ap-
proach of the statistical discrimination literature, though policy instruments
naturally differ from those considered in a labor market framework (for a
survey of the literature on discrimination in the labor market, see Lang and
Lehmann, 2012).
Furthermore, our model delivers novel insights about the impact of trade
policies. It is well-understood in the literature that export subsidies can be
welfare-improving or -decreasing depending on whether information exter-
nalities lead to a problem of insufficient or excessive entry, respectively.
Bagwell and Staiger (1989) focus on the welfare-improving case: they ex-
plore a situation in which asymmetric information yields socially insufficient
2In Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and in Chisik (2003), there are only two types of firms,
so by construction there cannot be the hollowing out of the middle that we obtain.
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entry. A subsidy can induce high-quality firms to enter the export market,
whereas absent the subsidy their entry may be blocked by their inability to
sell at prices reflecting their true quality. In contrast, Grossman and Horn
(1988) point out that asymmetric information may lead to socially exces-
sive entry when the quality choice is endogenous. In their model, an export
subsidy does encourage entry but the marginal entrants are those with the
greatest incentive to produce low-quality goods, reducing average quality
(see Grossman, 1990). Our model encompasses both effects. We obtain a
positive effect of an export subsidy in the LQE case: the subsidy induces
firms in the middle of the quality distribution to export, and the overall ef-
fect on average quality is positive.3 In a HQE, however, the dominant effect
of a subsidy is to worsen the socially excessive entry of low-quality firms.
We also depart from Chisik (2003) where export subsidies are of no use since
they do not alter the relative payoffs of high-quality and low-quality firms.
In our model, high-quality firms face a longer effective time horizon, so that
even a subsidy granted indiscriminately to all exporters tilts the incentive
to export in favor of high-quality firms.
Next, we analyze the effect of other trade policies, some of which have
been overlooked in the literature. We show that if the government can ob-
serve how many periods a firm has been in the market, it can design a
tax and subsidy program that similarly changes the relative incentives of
high-quality and low-quality firms and improves both quality and reputa-
tion. This result extends the finding by Bagwell and Staiger (1989) that
an introductory phase tax on exporters followed by a mature phase subsidy
improves welfare. The first-period tax can be interpreted as an export li-
cense. Chisik (2003) explores the effect of a similar policy – an optional
tax that is rebated only to firms that produce high quality – but imposes
more stringent information requirements by assuming that the government
perfectly learns the quality of every firm’s product after the initial period.
Alternatively, we show that a minimum quality standard can help move to
a more favorable equilibrium.
Our paper also relates to the industrial organization literature dealing
3This would still be the case if we allowed for an endogenous quality choice, although
fly-by-night firms would then always choose the minimum quality level.
5
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
with experience goods4 as well as with labels and quality certification.5
Lastly, the formation of collective reputations had been modelled by Ti-
role (1996) in a moral hazard setting, where group reputation is both the
outcome and a determinant of individual behavior.6
3. Model Set-Up
We develop a model with two countries. We focus on the industry equi-
librium in an export-oriented sector in the home country, for which the
foreign country is the importer. In the home country, there is a continuum
of potential exporters j of mass 1 being born every period. In the foreign
country, there is a pool of importers indexed by i, each of whom demands
one unit of the good. All firms in the industry produce for export only.7
3.1. Firms
Each new potential exporter j draws a quality parameter θ from a Pareto
distribution G (θ) with support on [θm,∞) and shape parameter α > 1. We
denote the unconditional expectation of quality draws by µ0, equal to
α
α−1θm.
Each firm j has the option to produce one unit of a good of quality level
θ (j).8
4Several early papers (Shapiro, 1983; Riordan, 1986; Farrell, 1986; Liebeskind and
Rumelt, 1989) have studied entry and pricing strategies for experience goods in a closed
economy framework. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996, 2006) incorporate the experimenta-
tion and learning processes by consumers. We develop these insights further by considering
the demand for imports, where initial priors depend on country-of-origin, and reputations
are built not only for specific firms but also for exporting countries as a whole.
5A strand of it assuming that quality is unknown to consumers (see e.g. Perrot and
Linnemer, 2000). This literature focuses on the signaling role of labels: labels act as
quality signals for individual firms which seek to signal quality and build consumer trust
(see e.g. Grossman, 1981; Klein and Leﬄer, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Lizzeri,
1999), but there are no reputation externalities between firms.
6His model generates a high- and a low-reputation steady-state equilibrium, but for
given initial conditions, there is a unique equilibrium. An interesting result is that a
one-time shock can have permanent effects on collective reputation, as in our model.
7Or, equivalently, markets are segmented. We could easily extend the model to allow
firms to serve their domestic market as long as the decisions to enter the domestic and
export markets are separable. The key assumption is that there is no information flowing
between buyers located in different geographic markets.
8For simplicity we do not model the quality choice. We can think of the exogenous
quality draw as determined on the domestic market before considering the decision to
export, or as a technology blueprint which comes from an R&D process with uncertain
outcome.
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At the beginning of every period, firms decide whether to stay active and
export, or shut down. If it produces and sells, firm j incurs a cost wθ (j)+k,
including both production and transport costs (with k > 0 and 0 < w < 1).
Hence, profits at period t+ s of an active firm j born at date t are:
pit+s (j) = pt+s (j)− wθ (j)− k (1)
where pt+s (j) is the price at which firm j sells its output.
A firm can freely exit at any period and realize zero profits from this
period onwards. However if it chooses to exit the export market in a given
period, it cannot re-enter later.9 Moreover, each firm has a probability
(1− δ) per period of suffering from an exogenous shock that forces it to
exit, independent of both quality and the firm’s age. This exogenous “exit
shock” acts as a discount rate, as in Melitz (2003).
3.2. Buyers
In the foreign country, each potential importer demands one unit of the
good. Potential demand for imported goods is assumed to be large, in the
sense that the market size is sufficient for all home exporters to find a buyer
at a price that does not exceed the expected value of their goods. The
true utility from consuming a good of quality level θ (j) is θ (j) but is not
observable before purchase.10
At the beginning of every period, each active firm j is randomly matched
to a foreign buyer i. The firm cannot sell to another importer in that period,
nor can the buyer purchase from another exporter before the next period.
The firm then sets the price equal to the expected value of the good for its
buyer.11 As θ (j) is not observed, the maximum price that an importer i is
willing to pay for the output of firm j at time t+ s is given by its expected
quality from the perspective of the buyer.
9This assumption is inconsequential for the steady-state analysis. It rules out coordi-
nation problems among high-quality firms along the transition path.
10The indirect utility buyer i receives from the good sold by firm j at time t + s is
uit+s (j) = θ (j)− pt+s (j), which can be derived from an additively separable utility func-
tion where buyer i consumes a numeraire good and one unit of the imported differentiated
good.
11We assume that firms hold all the bargaining power and receive the full expected
surplus of the transaction. Long-term contracts between exporters and importers are ruled
out in this setting: all contracts are one-period sales contracts and firms are matched to
customers for one period only. In particular, there cannot be price schedules resembling an
introductory pricing strategy, whereby buyers would pay a low price in the initial period
and offer a sequence of prices contingent on their future consumption experience.
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• • • • • •
Each active
firm is matched
with a buyer
and observes
whether the
buyer
is informed.
The price is
set by the firm,
and production
and sales
take place.
For each good
that was sold,
the fraction of
informed buyers
rises from ρ (s)
to ρ (s+ 1).
With probability
(1− δ),
each firm is
forced to exit
by a shock.
Firms that
survive
decide whether
to stay active.
New firms
are born
(cohort t+ s).
Figure 1: Timing of actions
There are two types of buyers, informed and uninformed. Uninformed
buyers have no information specific to firm j. The only information at
their disposal is the “national reputation”, i.e. a prior µt+s about expected
quality among all foreign exporters. µt+s is common across buyers and is
endogenized in Section 4. Informed buyers know the true quality of firm
j, either because they have past experience from consumption of good j
or because they have received information from another importer who has.
The price received by firm j matched with buyer i in period t+s is therefore
µt+s if i is uninformed, and θ (j) if i is informed.
In the first period when a firm j enters the market, all importers are
uninformed about j. Then, if firm j has exported s times in the past, a
fraction ρ (s) of buyers are informed, where we make the natural assump-
tion that the fraction of informed buyers increases as the firm gains export
experience (see Appendix B for a formal microfoundation).
Assumption 1. ρ′ ≥ 0, ρ (0) = 0, and lim
s→∞
ρ (s) = 1.
For expositional simplicity we drop the j notation in the next sections
and refer to “firm θ” instead of “firm j with quality parameter θ”.
3.3. Timing
For a given cohort of firms born at date t, each new firm draws a param-
eter θ and decides whether to export or not at t. For each s ≥ 1, at time
t+ s, the timing is shown in Figure 1.
3.4. Perfect Information
Under perfect information, all θ are observable by all parties. All firms
receive a price p∗t+s equal to true quality regardless of how long they have
been exporting: p∗t+s (θ) = θ for all s.
Therefore, it follows from (1) that firms are active exporters if and only
if θ ≥ θ∗, where the perfect information threshold is defined as:
8
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θ∗ ≡
k
1− w
(2)
The perfect information threshold is key for our analysis as we will show
that under asymmetric information, per-period profits converge over time
towards their perfect information value. Moreover, from a global welfare
point of view, it is not optimal for firms with quality below θ∗ to enter
export markets – in this case, the value of the output to consumers is lower
than the opportunity cost of production. However, given that exporters do
not internalize the impact of their decisions on consumer surplus, it can
be profitable for firms with quality below θ∗ to enter temporarily under
asymmetric information.
3.5. Imperfect Information: Price and Profits
Under asymmetric information, suppose µt is the buyers’ prior about the
expected quality of foreign goods at time t (“national reputation”), taken as
exogenous by individual firms although it is endogenous at the country level.
We derive its equilibrium value in Section 4. The price offered to a firm born
at date t is either the country-wide prior if the buyer is uninformed, or its
true quality if the buyer is informed. In the first period in which a firm is
active, no buyer has any information specific to the firm, so that the price
only depends on the prior: pt+1 = µt+1. Then in the following periods,
conditional on the firm still being active, the price is set according to the
following rule:
pt+s =
{
θ with probability ρ (s− 1)
µt+s with probability 1− ρ (s− 1)
for s ≥ 1 (3)
where ρ (s− 1) is the fraction of informed buyers for a firm that has pre-
viously exported (s− 1) times. The expectation of the price converges to
the perfect information price θ over time if the firm stays in the market
indefinitely.
The expected profits of the firm in future periods, conditional on remain-
ing active, are the difference between its expected price and its production
cost:
Etpit+s = [ρ (s− 1)− w] θ + [1− ρ (s− 1)]Etµt+s − k (4)
Expected profits place a larger weight on true quality and a smaller
weight on national reputation as the firm gains tenure into exporting. It
immediately follows that if reputation is time-invariant, which will be the
case in a steady-state equilibrium, a firm with quality above the country
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prior (θ > µ) expects to realize an increasing sequence of profits over time,
while a firm with quality below the country prior (θ < µ) expects decreasing
profits. For all active firms, if µ is constant, the price is monotonically
converging towards θ and per-period profits are monotonically converging
towards their perfect information value (1− w) θ − k.12
To ensure that expected profits from repeat purchases are increasing in
true quality, we assume that the updating parameter is large enough relative
to the cost of producing quality:
Assumption 2. ρ (1) > w
Firms are free to exit at any date. In each period t, a firm of quality
θ having exported s times in the past stays active if the expected present
value of doing so, PVt (θ, s), is positive:
PVt (θ, s) =
T (θ)∑
u=0
δu
(
[ρ (s+ u)− w] θ + [1− ρ (s+ u)]Etµt+u − k
)
(5)
where Etµt+u = µt+u for all u since there is no aggregate uncertainty, and
T (θ) is the exit date (possibly infinity) that maximizes the firm’s intertem-
poral problem.
4. Industry Equilibrium
4.1. Equilibrium Definition
We define a steady-state industry equilibrium as one in which national
reputation is endogenously pinned down by the average quality of a country’s
exports and the quality distribution is stationary. Country reputations are
taken as exogenous by individual firms. In each period t, let Mt (θ, s) be the
number of active firms of quality θ having previously exported s times. Let
Nt (θ) =
∑t
s=0Mt (θ, s) be the total number of active firms of quality θ. We
derive θt as the average quality of exports across quality levels and cohorts
of firms:
θt =
∫
∞
θm
θNt (θ) dθ∫
∞
θm
Nt (θ) dθ
(6)
A new firm of quality θ is active at t+ 1 if its expected present value of
doing so is positive. Hence the number of active new firms per quality level
12In Appendix C, we characterize the path of prices for a given cohort of firms.
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is:
Mt+1 (θ, 0) =
{
g (θ) if PVt+1 (θ, 0) > 0
0 if PVt+1 (θ, 0) ≤ 0
(7)
where g (θ) is the PDF of the quality distribution.
Among incumbent firms of quality θ having exported s times, δMt (θ, s− 1)
survive from period t to period t+1. They remain active if PVt+1 (θ, s) > 0
in equation (5). Thus the number of active old firms is, for s ≥ 1:
Mt+1 (θ, s) =
{
δMt (θ, s− 1) if PVt+1 (θ, s) > 0
0 if PVt+1 (θ, 0) ≤ 0
(8)
We can then define the industry steady-state as an equilibrium with
constant reputation and a constant distribution of quality.
Definition 1 (Steady-State Equilibrium).{
µ, {M (θ, s)}s,θ
}
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if:
i. For all θ ∈ [θm,∞) and all s ≥ 0, if Mt (θ, s) =M (θ, s) and Etµt+u = µ
for all u ≥ 0, then Mt+1 (θ, s) =M (θ, s) in (7) and (8);
ii. If Mt (θ, s) = M (θ, s) for all θ ∈ [θm,∞) and all s ≥ 0, then θt = µ in
(6).
Condition (i) ensures that the number of firms in each quality-age seg-
ment is constant in the steady state. Condition (ii) states that the average
quality resulting from an equilibrium distribution of active firms is equal
to the equilibrium country reputation. It guarantees that µ is constant in
a steady state. In other words, a steady state with national reputation µ
is a rational expectations equilibrium if the average quality of active ex-
porters is equal to buyers’ quality expectation. The endogenous entry and
exit decisions induced by µ justify the reputation ex post.13
13In the numerical examples, we assume that country reputations evolve according to the
actual quality of exported goods in the previous period as follows: µt+1 = µt+η
(
θt − µt
)
,
where η < 1 and θt is the average quality of foreign firms’ exports at period t. Setting
η < 1 captures the slow-moving aspect of reputations and only matters for equilibrium
stability. This equation is a reduced form for consumers’ updating process, where the
implied simplifying assumption is that η – which captures the speed at which beliefs are
updated – is constant. We adopt this simple rule-of-thumb formulation for beliefs updating
rather than modeling explicitly the Bayesian updating process for the sake of simplicity.
This hypothesis is not necessary for our main steady-state results and policy implications,
and only ensures that equilibrium stability holds under general conditions.
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4.2. Equilibrium Steady-State Reputation
Let θ (µ) be the average quality of exports as a function of constant be-
liefs µ. An equilibrium steady-state reputation is a time-invariant reputation
µ such that θ (µ) = µ.
To compute the fixed point(s) of θ (µ), we proceed as follows. First, we
characterize firms’ entry and exit decisions. Second, we compute Mt (θ, s),
i.e. the number of active firms of quality θ having previously exported s
times, and thus the average quality of exports as a function of µ. We then
derive the existence conditions for each type of equilibrium.
4.2.1. Sorting of Firms into Non Exporters and Exporters
Steady-state equilibria as defined by Definition 1 fall into one of two
regimes: a “high-quality equilibrium” (HQE) or a “low-quality equilibrium”
(LQE), depending on the position of the equilibrium country reputation
relative to the perfect information threshold.
Definition 2 (HQE & LQE).
A steady-state equilibrium
{
µ, {M (θ, s)}s,θ
}
is a high-quality steady-state
equilibrium if µ > θ∗, and a low-quality steady-state equilibrium if µ < θ∗.
The two regimes have different entry and exit patterns, due to the impact
of asymmetric information and the dynamics of consumer learning. Com-
pared to the perfect information case, the unobservability of quality initially
fosters entry by low-quality firms but depresses profits of the highest-quality
firms. In a HQE, a firm with quality equal to the country’s reputation would
be viable in a perfect information setting. All firms receive high prices as
they enter the market, which encourages entry. Therefore, imperfect infor-
mation does not hinder entry of high-quality firms into export markets but
generates excess entry by low-quality firms. On the contrary, in a LQE, a
firm with quality equal to the country’s reputation would never export in a
perfect information setting. Some low-quality firms still profit by free-riding
on the country reputation, but a range of firms with above-average quality
are permanently kept out of the market by the informational friction. In
other words, there is a hollowing out of the middle of the quality distribu-
tion. Proposition 1 establishes the sorting of firms into non exporters and
exporters in a HQE and in a LQE.
Proposition 1 (Sorting of Firms into Exporting: Two Regimes).
In a HQE:
1. All entrants are initially active;
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2. Firms with θ < θ∗ expect to exit after T (θ) periods where T is weakly
increasing in θ;
3. Firms with θ > θ∗ stay in the market until hit by the exogenous shock.
In a LQE:
1. Firms with quality θ < θL enter the export market and exit after selling
for one period, where θL ≡
µ−k
w < µ < θ
∗;
2. Firms with quality θ > θH enter and stay in the market until hit by the
exogenous shock, where θH ≡
k−µ(1−Aρ)
Aρ−w
> θ∗ and Aρ ≡ (1− δ)
∑
∞
s=0 δ
sρ (s) .
3. Firms with quality θL ≤ θ ≤ θH never enter the market.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
Figure 2 shows the sorting of firms according to their quality parameter
in each regime. In a HQE (upper figure 2a), all low-quality firms (below
θ∗) find it profitable to enter initially as fly-by-nights, as they have low
production costs and can therefore reap positive expected profits as long as
a small enough number of buyers have information about their type. The
higher the country reputation, the higher the price they receive in the first
period. However, they become less profitable as consumers gain information
about their quality through consumption experience. Low-quality firms thus
face a decreasing sequence of expected profits converging to a negative value;
they will eventually see their expected present value of profits turn negative
and exit. The lowest-quality firms exit first, and θT is the highest quality
type that exits after selling for T periods.14 For high-quality firms (above
θ∗), it is always profitable to enter and keep exporting. Firms between
θ∗ and µ have expected profits declining over time, but positive in every
period. Firms above µ have expected profits increasing over time. The
highest quality firms incur losses in the initial period but recoup these losses
in later periods once enough buyers have received information about their
type; their expected intertemporal profits are always positive.
In a LQE (bottom figure 2b), there is a range of low-quality firms (be-
low θL) that gain from the information asymmetry and realize positive first-
period profits. However they would make losses if they were to stay active in
14Firms below θ∗ exit after T (θ) periods, where T (θ) is the exit date that max-
imizes the firm’s intertemporal profit (see equation (5)). We can derive θT =
max
{
k−[1−ρ(T )]µ
ρ(T )−w
, θm
}
for T ≥ 1 and limT→∞ θT = θ
∗ (See Appendix A.1).
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(a) High-Quality Equilibrium
(b) Low-Quality Equilibrium
Figure 2: Sorting of firms by θ
the second period. These firms therefore exit immediately after selling once,
while in a HQE low-quality firms that enter initially as fly-by-nights can
last longer than one period. An intermediate range of middle-quality firms
[θL, θH ] around θ
∗ never become active exporters. Those with θL < θ < θ
∗
have negative expected profits at all periods, while those with θ∗ < θ < θH
would be profitable in the long run once enough buyers have gathered infor-
mation about their type. However, for the latter, the present value of their
profit stream is negative: losses incurred in the initial periods in order to es-
tablish a reputation are not made up for with later expected profits. Hence
this range of firms is kept out of export markets by the information asym-
metry and the cost of revealing quality. Finally, high-quality firms (above
θH) are not profitable in the first period but nevertheless choose to enter
given that expected profits from sales in later periods, when a larger portion
of the price reflects true quality, exceed initial losses. The negative profits
in their first export periods can be interpreted as investments in building a
firm-specific brand name.
4.2.2. Average Quality
The numberM (θ, s) of active firms of quality θ having already exported
s times is derived from Proposition 1 and equations (7) and (8).
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High-quality equilibrium. In a HQE, the number M (θ, s) of active firms of
quality θ having already exported s times is:
M (θ, s) =


δsg (θ) if θ < θ∗ and s < T (θ)
0 if θ < θ∗ and s ≥ T (θ)
δsg (θ) if θ ≥ θ∗
(9)
so that the total number N (θ) of active firms of quality θ is 1−δ
T (θ)
1−δ g (θ) if
θ < θ∗, and 11−δg (θ) if θ ≥ θ
∗. The steady-state average quality of exports
in a HQE as a function of µ and exogenous parameters is given by equation
(6) as:
θ (µ) = µ0


1−
∞∑
T=0
δT+1
[(
θm
θT
)α−1
−
(
θm
θT+1
)α−1]
1−
∞∑
T=0
δT+1
[(
θm
θT+1
)α
−
(
θm
θT+1
)α]

 (10)
where θ0 ≡ θm. The average quality of active firms is higher than the mean
of the unconditional distribution of θ, as lower-quality firms exit earlier than
higher-quality firms. However, it lies below the perfect information average
quality.
Low-quality equilibrium. In a LQE, the number of active firms of quality θ
having already exported s times is given by:
M (θ, s) =


g (θ) if θ < θL and s = 0
0 if θ < θL and s ≥ 1 or if θL ≤ θ ≤ θH
δsg (θ) if θ > θH
(11)
so that the total number N (θ) of active firms of quality θ is g (θ) if θ < θL
and 11−δg (θ) if θ > θH . The steady-state average quality of exports in a
LQE as a function of µ and exogenous parameters is given by equation (6):
θ (µ) = µ0

1−
(
θm
θL
)α−1
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α−1
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α

 (12)
4.2.3. Existence Conditions
A steady-state equilibrium is a fixed point of θ (µ) defined by equation
(12) on [θm, θ
∗] and by equation (10) on [θ∗,∞). An equilibrium such that
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µ = θ (µ) < θ∗ is a LQE. An equilibrium such that µ = θ (µ) > θ∗ is a HQE.
Proposition 2 establishes existence conditions.
Proposition 2 (Existence Conditions).
1. There is always at least one steady-state equilibrium.
2. There is one HQE (and zero or a positive number of LQEs) if and
only if θ (θ∗) > θ∗, i.e. if and only if:
α
(
θm
θ∗
)
+
δ
1− δ
(
θm
θ∗
)α
> α− 1 (13)
3. There is no HQE and at least one LQE if and only if θ (θ∗) < θ∗.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Hence, depending on the parameters, the rational expectations steady-
state falls into one of two regimes: a LQE or a HQE. The number of equi-
libria is odd except in the knife-edge case where θ (µ) is tangent to the
45-degree line. The type of equilibrium depends on whether the (not neces-
sarily unique) fixed point of θ (µ) falls left or right of θ∗. Figure 3 provides a
graphical illustration. The figure represents the steady-state average qual-
ity of exports θ (µ) as a function of µ (red line). The black diagonal is a
45-degree line, and we plot a vertical dotted line at the perfect information
threshold θ∗. The upper left figure 3a illustrates the existence of a HQE:
θ (θ∗) > θ∗ and there is one HQE, µ′S . This equilibrium is not unique: there
are also two LQEs, µS and µU . In the upper right figure 3b, there is also a
HQE but it is the unique equilibrium of the economy. On the contrary, the
bottom left figure 3c illustrates the fact that when θ (θ∗) < θ∗, there is no
HQE. In this example, there is a unique LQE, µS . Finally, the bottom right
figure 3d illustrates the case with several LQEs and no HQE.
The existence condition (13) for a HQE holds for δ (the probability
that a firm still exists from one period to the next) high enough, α (the
shape parameter of the distribution) low enough, and k (the costs that
are independent of quality) and w (the costs that increase with quality)
low enough. Figure 4 depicts this existence condition. In the dark region,
condition (13) holds and there exists one HQE. In subfigure 4a, we fix the
values of k and w and show that there exists a HQE if α is low enough and δ is
high enough. A high δ implies that exogenous exit is relatively less prevalent
than endogenous exit, increasing the relative mass of high-quality firms. A
low α means that there is high dispersion in the prior distribution of θ and
16
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(a) Multiple LQEs and one HQE (b) No LQE and a unique HQE
(c) No HQE and a unique LQE (d) No HQE and multiple LQEs
Notes: In subfigure 3a, the fixed parameter values are: θm = 1, α = 2.2, δ = 0.7, k = 1.2,
w = 0.5. The perfect information threshold is θ∗ = 2.4. The steady states of this economy
are µS ≈ 1.900, µU ≈ 2.230 and µ
′
S ≈ 2.477. In subfigure 3c, the parameters are the same
except α = 2.4. The unique steady state of this economy is µS ≈ 1.767. In subfigure 3b,
the fixed parameter values are the same as in subfigure 3c except δ = 0.8. The unique
steady state of this economy is µS ≈ 2.492. In subfigure 3d, the fixed parameter values
are: θm = 1, α = 3, δ = 0.5, k = 1.18, w = 0.3. The perfect information threshold is
θ∗ ≈ 1.686, and the steady states are µS ≈ 1.540, µU ≈ 1.660 and µ
′
S ≈ 1.678.
Figure 3: Unique and multiple equilibria
17
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
therefore more firms at the right tail of the distribution pushing up the mean.
Note that this result is related to Chisik (2015), who develops a model of
statistical discrimination and productivity signaling with stereotype threat.
He finds that the existence of multiple self-fulfilling steoretypes is more likely
if there is less variance in the ability distribution.
In subfigure 4b, we fix the values of k and δ. There exists one HQE if w is
low enough. Intuitively, a low w reduces the relative cost advantage of low-
quality firms, as well as the loss incurred in initial periods by high-quality
firms. Similarly, a low k also reduces the initial losses of high-quality firms
and lowers the perfect information threshold θ∗, expanding the existence
region of a HQE.
(a) (b)
Notes: Fixed parameter values in subfigure 4a: θm = 1, k = 1.5, w = 0.5. Fixed
parameter values in subfigure 4b: θm = 1, k = 1.5, δ = 0.95.
Figure 4: Parameter values for the existence of a HQE
4.3. Equilibrium Stability and Reputation Shocks
A steady-state equilibrium is stable if after a small shock to the country
reputation µ, the economy reverts to the initial equilibrium. We characterize
the stability properties of HQEs and LQEs in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium stability).
1. A HQE is always stable.
2. A LQE µS is stable if
θ(µ)
µ is locally decreasing at µS.
3. A LQE µU is unstable if
θ(µ)
µ is locally increasing at µU .
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Proof: see Appendix A.3.
The intuition of the stability results relies on entry and exit decisions.
In a HQE, it follows from (10) that θ (µ) is continuously decreasing in µ
on [θ∗,∞). Improving national reputation does not affect the incentives of
firms above θ∗ to stay or exit, but it encourages lower-quality firms to stay
longer. Hence, starting from a HQE, an improvement in national reputation
µ has a negative effect on actual quality, which ensures that a high-quality
steady state is stable.
In a LQE, θ (µ) as derived in (12) is not necessarily monotonic over
[θm, θ
∗]. On the one hand, a higher µ reduces the initial loss incurred by
high-quality firms, allowing more firms with above-average quality to be
active. On the other hand, a better reputation enables more firms to realize
positive profits from first-period sales; this fosters entry by firms with below-
average quality. The net change in the average quality depends on the
balance between these two effects. If θ (µ) /µ is locally decreasing in µ (i.e.
θ crosses the 45-degree line from above), the former dominates and the LQE
is stable. If θ (µ) /µ is locally increasing in µ (i.e. θ crosses the 45-degree
line from below), the latter dominates and the LQE is unstable.
The equilibrium structure implies that in the presence of multiple equi-
libria, pure reputation shocks can have long-run effects even without any
independent change in fundamentals.15 Starting from a stable equilibrium,
suppose there is a negative reputation shock, i.e. a one-shot decrease in µt
absent any change in the underlying quality distribution of firms. If the
economy has only one long-run equilibrium, it must return to this steady
state in the long run. If the economy has multiple steady states, however,
reputation shocks can induce a transition to a different equilibrium. A small
reputation shock only has short-lived effects as the economy reverts to its ini-
tial equilibrium, but a large enough reputation shock can have self-fulfilling
effects. Figure 3a above provides an illustration of this case when three equi-
libria exist. If the initial stable equilibrium is the HQE µ′S , a “large”shock
µt below the unstable LQE µU deteriorates national reputation both in the
short- and in the long-run. The new steady-state equilibrium is the LQE
µS .
Hence, our model predicts that there can be long-term consequences of
a sudden large drop in reputation, which moves a country to a less desir-
15Negative reputation shocks have been analyzed empirically through event studies, such
as recalls of Chinese toys (Freedman et al., 2012) or the negative perception of France in
the US at the onset of the Iraq war (Michaels and Zhi, 2010).
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able steady-state equilibrium. In particular, large product recalls or heavily
mediatized consumer safety scandals concerning exports of one country can
permanently affect the structure of its industry, lowering both quality and
reputation in the long-run.
5. Policy Implications
How can countries improve their “national brand name”– and is it worth
it? First-best policies would involve conducting verifiable quality audits or
taxing low-quality firms and subsidizing high-quality ones. These policies
are not feasible when policy-makers are not better informed than consumers
about firms’ quality levels. We analyze the effects of three policy instruments
on reputation, quality and welfare: (i) export subsidies, (ii) a tax scheme
based on export tenure, and (iii) minimum quality standards.
5.1. Export Subsidies
Export subsidies have been used historically by a number of countries to
favor exporting activities. For example in South Korea, public investment
subsidies were tied to exporting activity in the 1970s, as Korean governments
were determined to favor the emergence of the country on the international
trade scene.16 In our model an export subsidy is a permanent17 unantici-
pated subsidy to fixed export costs, resulting in a lower effective k for active
exporters, financed by non-distortionary lump-sum taxes.
Interestingly, export subsidies have opposite effects in the two types of
equilibria. In a LQE, an export subsidy leads to higher entry by firms in
the middle of the quality distribution. We show that the overall effect on
average quality, and thus steady-state national reputation, is positive as
long as δ is not too low: starting from a LQE, an export subsidy increases
long-run equilibrium quality and the welfare of the exporting country.18 On
the contrary, in a HQE, an export subsidy is actually detrimental to welfare
as it discourages exit by low-quality firms, worsening the problem of socially
excessive entry. These results are summarized in Proposition 4.
16Pack and Westphal (1986), Westphal (1990), Levy (1991), Rodrik (1995) and Aw et al.
(1998) have documented the importance of government investment subsidies in Korea.
17We are comparing the long-run industry equilibria with and without the policy. With
a subsidy of limited duration, if the equilibrium is unique, the economy would return to
the initial steady state in the long-run after the subsidy expires.
18Since there are no domestic consumers in our model and foreign consumers always
receive a zero surplus, the welfare of the exporting country is composed of exporters’
profits and fiscal balance.
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Proposition 4 (Export Subsidy).
1. An export subsidy in a LQE increases the steady-state average quality
of exports and welfare of the exporting country.
2. An export subsidy in a HQE decreases the steady-state average quality
of exports and welfare of the exporting country.
Proof: see Appendix A.4.
More specifically, in a LQE, a decrease in k induces more relatively high-
quality firms to start and continue exporting (lower θH) and more relatively
low-quality firms to export for one period (higher θL). The net effect of
this entry response is an increase in average quality, which creates a positive
externality on firms that would be exporting regardless of the policy. They
receive higher prices on their exports due to improved reputation. New
exporters also benefit from the better reputation as well as the subsidy, so
that the increase in aggregate profits exceeds the tax cost of the subsidy.19
The welfare gain is a direct outcome of higher long-run reputation.20
In a HQE, however, a permanent export subsidy lowers average quality
by inducing low-quality firms to remain exporters longer, while it does not
change the incentives and decisions of high-quality firms. The number of
active low-quality firms increases but the number of active high-quality firms
remains unchanged. The lower average quality in turn damages the country’s
reputation, which decreases the profits of all exporters. Because of this
negative externality from excessive entry, the overall increase in aggregate
profits of all firms receiving the subsidy is not large enough to cover the cost
of the policy, despite a higher volume of sales.21
Overall, the desirability of an export subsidy depends on the trade-off
between encouraging entry by high-quality firms which are deterred by the
19In a setting where firms would set prices in a competitive way, we would have to
balance this gain against the argument that an export subsidy tends to subsidize foreign
consumers.
20Figures A.1 and A.2 in the online Appendix provide a numerical examples of the
transition paths to the new steady states starting from, respectively, a LQE and a HQE.
21We can decompose the welfare effect into two components. For the combination of
quality and export experience for which firms are active both with and without the subsidy,
the effect is negative: they receive lower prices and the additional profits brought about
by the subsidy are taken out of taxes. For the additional periods in which firms below θ∗
stay in the market because of the subsidy, their profits fall short of the cost of the subsidy:
otherwise, since the price is lower than in the absence of the policy, they would have
been exporting without the subsidy. Therefore, the total welfare change is unambiguously
negative.
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Notes: The initial parameter values are identical to subfigure 3a. The export subsidy is
a reduction in k from 1.2 to 1.15. The initial θ∗ is 2.4 and the post-policy θ∗ is 2.3.
Figure 5: Equilibria before and after an export subsidy
cost of establishing a reputation, and inducing entry by low-quality fly-by-
night firms. The former impact dominates for countries initially exporting
low-quality goods, while the latter prevails for countries that already ex-
port a large share of high-quality goods. Figure 5 illustrates how an export
subsidy shifts the average quality function and affects the steady state equi-
libria. In this example, starting from a situation with two LQEs and one
HQE, the export subsidy eliminates all but one equilibrium which is a HQE.
The post-policy unique steady state is higher than the pre-policy LQEs but
lower than the pre-policy HQE.
The distinction between the two regimes is new compared to the existing
literature. It reconciles the argument that export subsidies can help high-
quality firms enter a market when they are initially unable to separate from
low-quality firms (as in Bagwell and Staiger, 1989) with the criticism by
Grossman and Horn (1988) according to which the marginal entrants are
those with the greatest incentive to produce low-quality goods. Our model
delivers both of these predictions, depending on the initial equilibrium type.
It suggests, in particular, that the gain from such policies – or lack thereof –
may critically depend on the level of development and export sophistication
of the exporting country.
5.2. A Tax and Subsidy Program
Let us now assume that the government is able to observe the “age”
of a firm, i.e. the number of periods it has previously exported. Start-
ing from a LQE, is there a tax/subsidy scheme based on the duration of
export experience that replicates the perfect information outcome? It is
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noteworthy to observe first that a temporary subsidy (subsidizing entrants)
can never do better than a permanent subsidy to all exporters. A subsidy
that targets new firms only disproportionately benefits low-quality firms,
which account for a higher share of entrants than incumbents. As such,
infant industry protection in the traditional sense is counterproductive in
our model: it would lower average quality, worsen the country’s reputation
and hurt overall profits. A more promising alternative is to tax entrants and
subsidize incumbents, so as to improve the relative payoffs of high-quality
firms compared to low-quality firms. In order to replicate the perfect infor-
mation equilibrium, the tax should deter firms below θ∗ from entering the
market, but the subsequent subsidy should be sufficient to enable all firms
above θ∗ to earn positive intertemporal profits. However, the design of the
tax/subsidy scheme must take into account the fact that if it is successful,
the endogenous reputation change also affects the profitability of entry and
exit. In fact, we show that when using taxes and subsidies based on age to
replicate the perfect information outcome, the policy involves taxing firms
for a number of periods and only subsidizing the most mature exporters.
Proposition 5 (Taxes and Subsidies based on Export Experience).
The perfect information entry and exit decisions by quality and export ex-
perience can be replicated by the following tax/subsidy scheme, where τs is
the tax (possibly negative) levied on a firm that has previously exported s−1
times:
τ1 =
(
α
α− 1
)
k
1− w
− k − wθm > 0
τs =
[
1− ρ (s− 1) +
1− δ
δ
]
1
α− 1
k
1− w
−
(
1− δ
δ
)
τ1 for s > 1
The resulting steady-state average quality and reputation are
(
α
α−1
)
θ∗.
Proof: see Appendix A.5.
The tax/subsidy scheme needs to satisfy three conditions. First, the first-
period tax needs to be high enough that no firm below θ∗ earns positive
profits in the first period. This is ensured by setting τ1 at least equal to
the first-period profits of the lowest quality firm. Second, the taxes on
incumbents need to be large enough not to induce any firm below θ∗ to
enter and stay beyond the first period despite initial losses. Third, the
taxes on incumbents also need to be small enough to allow all high-quality
firms above θ∗ to realize positive expected profits over time. These three
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conditions are achieved by setting the tax and subsidy rates as in Proposition
5. τs is decreasing in s and is negative for large enough s. An important
point is that there needs not be a large subsidy for continuing exporters,
because the endogenous change in reputation acts as an implicit subsidy for
firms which are still active exporters after the policy is put in place. By
discouraging the entry of low-quality firms, the tax on entrants improves
the country reputation, which allows the remaining firms in the market to
charge higher prices. The price effect makes up partially or fully for the
effect of the tax on profits, in such a way that the government needs to
compensate these firms less through later subsidies.
As long as the government can observe the export tenure of each firm
and there is no cost of collecting taxes and distributing subsidies, this
tax/subsidy scheme is optimal from a global and domestic welfare point of
view. However, it has a distributional impact as not all firms benefit from
the policy. On the one hand, the low-quality firms that would export with-
out the tax (below the initial θL) lose profits. On the other hand, the firms
that become exporters because of the policy (initially between θ∗ and θH)
gain as they are now able to realize positive profits; and firms that export in
both cases (above θH) gain from higher prices brought about by the better
country reputation. Overall, the improvement in reputation raises global
welfare. Since all the surplus is captured by the home country through the
pricing mechanism, the losses incurred by firms pushed out of the market,
whose production is socially inefficient, are more than offset by the gains of
the new and remaining exporters.
The large first-period tax can be interpreted as an export license. All
entrants are required to pay the initial tax, while only high-quality firms
benefit in equilibrium from the lower tax rates in later periods and eventu-
ally from a subsidy. In this regard, the policy resembles the export license
or quality stamp explored by Chisik (2003) whereby an optional tax is re-
bated only to firms that produce high quality. Chisik (2003) finds that this
policy supports a separating equilibrium and improves welfare, but he needs
to assume that the government perfectly observes the quality of a firm’s ex-
ported products after the first period. Our tax and subsidy program relaxes
this assumption by only requiring that the government observes the export
tenure of each firm. From this point of view, it is closer to the introductory
tax and mature phase subsidy described by Bagwell and Staiger (1989), but
we generalize their result to a large number of periods and types and take
into account the endogenous response of consumer beliefs.
Our solution has the novel feature that it depends on the variance of the
quality distribution. The taxes τ1 and τs are decreasing in the shape pa-
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rameter α (for all s), which implies that they are increasing in the variance
of the distribution of firm quality types. Similarly, the post-policy equilib-
rium quality and reputation increase with variance. A higher variance does
not affect the perfect information threshold but raises the average quality
of firms above the threshold. Therefore, the equilibrium country reputation
under the policy is higher the higher the variance. Low-quality firms would
stand to make larger pre-tax profits if they were to enter, hence a higher
path of taxes is needed to deter them and to support the perfect information
outcome.
Lastly, a caveat is that this policy may suffer from a time inconsistency
problem, a point also raised in Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and Chisik (2003).
Once low-quality firms have decided not to enter, the government has no fur-
ther incentive to carry through with the announced taxes and subsidies on
continuing exporters. This concern can be alleviated by the fact that it is
a repeated game. In our model with an infinite horizon and new cohorts
of firms every period, if new firms can observe the taxes paid and subsidies
received by older generations of firms, the announced policies need to be im-
plemented for the government to maintain its credibility with new entrants
and sustain the higher steady-state equilibrium. However, such a coopera-
tive equilibrium might not be sustainable, for example if government officials
are not re-electable or if there are term limits.
5.3. Minimum Quality Standards
Finally, we examine the effect of imposing minimum quality standards.
An advantage of minimum quality standards is that they are not affected
by the time inconsistency problem. Quality standards have been used by
Japan, for instance, in the aftermath of World War II. At that time, “Made
in Japan” goods had a reputation for being cheap low-quality goods. To
improve their “national brand”, both Japanese private companies and the
government proceeded to impose strict quality norms (Matsushita, 1979).22
Providing product quality assurances to importers stimulated growth in ex-
ports, improved terms of trade, and was key to establish a reputation for
product quality (Lynn and McKeown, 1988).
We model a minimum quality standard (MQS) as a quality threshold
θMQ. We assume that firms of quality lower than θMQ are never able to sell
22Japanese firms formed export cartels which provided product quality guarantees, by
setting product design and quality standards, establishing industry brand names, guaran-
teeing delivery schedules and mediating disputes between individual exporters and foreign
buyers (Dyck, 1992).
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their products.23 We focus on the situation in which the economy is initially
in a LQE.
If there is no cost of implementing the standard, then from a global
welfare point of view, it is optimal to set θMQ = θ
∗. In other words, it is
socially inefficient to let firms of quality below θ∗ enter the export market.
However, not all firms benefit from the standard. Let us call µinit the initial
steady-state reputation, and define θL,init and θH,init as the corresponding
thresholds. Firms with quality θ < θL,init lose from the policy: they were
making positive profits from a fly-by-night strategy before the introduction
of the standard, but are shut out of the market afterwards. The gains from
introducting a MQS are reaped by firms with quality θ∗ < θ < θH,init, which
were not exporting in the initial equilibrium, and by firms with quality
θ > θH,init, which were already exporting but receive extra profits brought
about by a higher reputation (see Appendix A.6 for details).
Suppose now that the cost of implementing the standard is c (θMQ) and
is strictly positive for any θMQ > θm. If the implementation cost does
not depend on the threshold, i.e. if c′ (θMQ) = 0, the welfare-maximizing
threshold conditional on the existence of the policy is still θ∗. However,
if the cost of certifying quality is higher than the welfare gain from the
resulting improvement in reputation, then it is too costly for the government
to support the perfect information equilibrium and the optimal policy is to
set no standard at all.
The most interesting case is one in which the cost of inspection increases
with the threshold, i.e. c′ (θMQ) > 0. Then even if c (θ
∗) is high enough
that it is not worth implementing the perfect information outcome, setting
the standard at a lower level can still be welfare-enhancing. While the non-
linearity of quality and reputation precludes us from deriving a closed-form
solution for the optimal MQS, we can show that even a small standard can
support a HQE. Figure 6 illustrates such a case. In this example, a low
MQS is implemented. It results in an upwards shift in the average quality
function, which eliminates the LQEs of this economy. Starting from the
stable LQE, the economy transitions towards the unique post-policy HQE.
It is noteworthy that, first, the standard did not need to be set at a high
level to induce this transition; and second, such a policy also improves the
steady-state reputation when the economy starts in a HQE, contrary to
23For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the inspection probability is always equal
to 100%. A controlled non-compliant firm has to exit the export market after it incurs
the production cost wθ + k and before it can sell its good. Controlled firms of quality
θ < θMQ thus make losses, and in equilibrium never enter.
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Notes: The initial parameter values are identical to subfigure 3a. The perfect information
threshold is θ∗ = 2.4. The minimum quality standard truncates the distribution of active
firms at θMQ = 1.05.
Figure 6: Equilibria before and after the introduction of a low MQS
export subsidies.
Lastly, it may be too costly for the government to set a minimum qual-
ity standard high enough to support a HQE. In such cases, if the cost of
certifying quality is too high and the government is unable to pre-commit
to a path of future taxes, the best policy may be to supplement the MQS
with export subsidies.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that when consumers are not fully informed about the
quality of what they buy, national reputation matters for exporters. The in-
ability to reveal quality to consumers before purchase distorts the incentives
to enter export markets for new firms. Low-quality firms rely on the national
brand, while high-quality firms suffer from it. More broadly, unobservable
quality tilts the long-run quality composition of an export-oriented industry
towards its low end, all the more so as the exporting economy has a poor
reputation for quality. In that respect, reputation has self-perpetuating fea-
tures since future national reputation adjusts to past exports quality. These
issues are particularly relevant for developing countries trying to grow into
exporting increasingly sophisticated goods. National reputations create his-
tory dependence in the range of goods a country can successfully export.
A damaged national reputation is a barrier to entry for companies that de-
velop more expensive high-quality products, threatening the success of such
a growth strategy. In those cases, we have examined several possible pol-
icy responses designed to enhance the quality reputation and welfare of an
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exporting country.
This analysis suggests several avenues for future empirical research. In
our model, the rational expectations steady-state can fall into one of two
categories. In a high-quality equilibrium, all firms are able to export: low-
quality firms enter initially as fly-by-nights and eventually exit after a given
number of periods; high-quality firms enter and keep exporting. In a low-
quality equilibrium, an intermediate range of middle-quality firms never be-
come active exporters. This difference in the sorting of firms into exporters
and non exporters may be useful for future empirical research to identify
low-quality traps. In addition, case studies have already provided evidence
of the benefits of a reputation for quality in terms of brand premia (Imbs
et al., 2010) and image spillovers across products of the same brand (Sulli-
van, 1990). We develop these insights further by considering the demand for
imports, where initial priors depend on country-of-origin and reputations are
built not only for specific firms but also for exporting countries as a whole.
Our findings could lay the ground for future research analyzing empirically
the extent to which country reputations matter for trade flows.
Going further, our analysis provides a framework for a richer under-
standing of firms’ sourcing decisions through the lens of a strategic use of
“made in” rules. Exporters can find it optimal to resort to original equip-
ment manufacturers or depart from the cost-minimizing way of splitting the
production process across locations, in order to obtain a favorable country-
of-origin denomination. The location of manufacturing and assembly will
be decided not only according to cost considerations, but also depending on
the regulations surrounding rules of origin, consumer sensitivity to quality,
and the degree of asymmetric information in the industry. An extension of
our model along these lines would generate testable predictions at the firm
level. These topics will be investigated in future research.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Appendix A.1. Proof of Proposition 1: Sorting of Firms into Exports
Appendix A.1.1. High-Quality Equilibrium
Assume there is a steady state equilibrium where µ > k1−w . First,
consider firms with θ < θ∗ born at date t. Since their expected profits
are decreasing with time, they are active in the first period if and only if
Etpit+1 (θ) = µ − wθ − k > 0, which requires θ ≤
µ−k
w . Since µ >
k
1−w ,
it is straightforward that µ−kw > µ > θ
∗ which ensures Etpit+1 (θ) > 0 for
all firms born at t which have quality θ < θ∗. Hence all such firms enter
initially. Also, θ < k1−w and ρ
′ > 0 imply that Etpit+s in (4) is decreasing
in s and lims→∞Etpit+s = (1− w) θ − k < 0 so all firms below θ
∗ expect to
exit in finite time when their profits turn negative. The expected number of
periods a firm θ born at t is active is T (θ) given by [1− ρ (T (θ − 1))]µ >
[w − ρ (T (θ)− 1)] θ + k and [1− ρ (T (θ))]µ < [w − ρ (T (θ))] θ + k.
The highest quality type θT that exits after selling for T periods (or the
lowest quality type that exits after selling for T + 1 periods) is defined by
Etpit+T+1 (θT ) = 0, hence
θT = max
{
k − [1− ρ (T )]µ
ρ (T )− w
, θm
}
(A.1)
and θT is increasing with T :
∂θT
∂T ∝ ρ
′ (T ) (µ (1− w)− k) > 0 as ρ′ >
0 and µ > θ∗
Second, consider firms with θ∗ < θ < µ. These firms expect pos-
itive profits at all periods: they have Etpit+s (θ) monotonically decreas-
ing, from pit+1 (θ) = µ − wθ − k > µ (1− w) − k > 0 since θ < µ, to
lims→∞Etpit+s (θ) = θ (1− w) − k > 0 since θ > θ
∗. Hence firms with
θ∗ < θ < µ always enter the market and stay until they are exogenously
forced to exit.
Finally, consider the highest quality firms with θ > µ. Such firms
have increasing expected profits over time. They enter the market if and
only if their expected intertemporal profits are positive, which requires:
Et
(∑
∞
s=1 δ
s−1pit+s (θ)
)
=
∑
∞
s=0 δ
s [(ρ (s)− w) θ + (1− ρ (s))µ] − k1−δ > 0
or equivalently:
θ >
k − µ (1− δ)
∑
∞
s=0 δ
s (1− ρ (s))
(1− δ)
∑
∞
s=0 δ
sρ (s)− w
≡ θH (A.2)
Let us show that θH < µ. Rearranging:
θH < µ iff µ [(1− δ)
∑
∞
s=0 δ
s (1− ρ (s)) + (1− δ)
∑
∞
s=0 δ
sρ (s)] > wµ+ k
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or equivalently iff µ > k1−w which holds by assumption in the high reputation
case. Hence all firms with θ > µ always export until they are hit by the
exogenous shock.
Appendix A.1.2. Low-Quality Equilibrium
Assume there is a steady state equilibrium with µ < k1−w . First, consider
firms with θ < µ born at date t. Since their expected profits are decreasing
with time, they are active in the first period if and only if Etpit+1 (θ) =
µ − wθ − k > 0, which requires θ ≤ µ−kw ≡ θL. We can immediately check
that µ < k1−w ⇔ θL < µ. Expected second-period profits are Etpit+2 (θ) =
(ρ (1)− w) θ+(1− ρ (1))µ−k < (1− w)µ−k < 0 since θ < µ and ρ (1) > w.
Hence among firms with θ < µ, those with θ < θL are active in the first
period and exit afterwards, and those with θL ≤ θ < µ are never active.
Second, consider firms with µ ≤ θ < θ∗. These firms have Etpit+1 (θ) < 0
since θ > θL, Etpit+s (θ) monotonically increasing in s since θ ≥ µ, and
lims→∞Etpit+s (θ) < 0 since θ < θ
∗. Thus their expected profits are negative
in all periods and they optimally exit after drawing their quality parameter.
Third, consider firms with θ > θ∗. These firms have Etpit+s (θ) monoton-
ically increasing in s since θ > µ, and lims→∞Etpit+s (θ) > 0 since θ > θ
∗.
If they decide to be active in the first period, they expect to remain in the
market as long as they survive the exogenous shock. However given θ > θL
they incur a loss in the initial periods. The condition for a firm of type
θ > θ∗ to be active is for intertemporal expected profits to be positive,
which requires θ >
k−(1−Aρ)µ
Aρ−w
≡ θH as derived in (A.2), where we define
Aρ ≡ (1− δ)
∑
∞
s=0 δ
sρ (s). Finally, θH > θ
∗ iff
k−(1−Aρ)µ
Aρ−w
> k1−w which sim-
plifies to k1−w > µ and holds by definition in the low reputation case. Hence
firms with θ∗ ≤ θ ≤ θH are never active and firms with θ > θH enter the
export market and stay active.
Lastly, the equilibrium reputation must satisfy µ > k + wθm. Suppose
µ is a steady state reputation and µ < k + wθm. The first period price µ
does not cover the production cost of the lowest quality firm, hence no firm
below θ∗ finds it profitable to enter. It follows that no rational expectations
equilibrium can have µ < θ∗, so there is no LQE with µ < k+wθm. Similarly,
if θ∗ < µ < k + wθm, then firms with θ < µ would have negative profits
in all periods. Hence such firms are never active, and µ cannot be a HQE
reputation under rational expectations.
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Appendix A.2. Proof of Proposition 2: Existence Conditions
Proposition 2 establishes the existence of at least one steady state equi-
librium and the possibility of multiple equilibria. We investigate how θ (µ)
varies with µ on [θm,∞). Then, we compute the fixed points of the function
θ (µ), and show that there can be multiple fixed points.
Appendix A.2.1. Average Quality Function
Given Proposition 1 and equation (6), the average quality θ of active
firms in a steady state as a function of the country reputation µ is, on
[θm, θ
∗]:
θ (µ) = µ0


(1− δ)
(
1−
(
θm
θL
)α−1)
+
(
θm
θH
)α−1
(1− δ)
(
1−
(
θm
θL
)α)
+
(
θm
θH
)α

 (A.3)
and on [θ∗,∞):
θ (µ) = µ0


1−
∑
∞
T=0 δ
T+1
((
θm
θT
)α−1
−
(
θm
θT+1
)α−1)
1−
∑
∞
T=0 δ
T+1
((
θm
θT
)α
−
(
θm
θT+1
)α)


= µ0

1 +
∑
∞
T=T˜
δT
(
θm
θT
)α−1
1 +
∑
∞
T=T˜
δT
(
θm
θT
)α


(A.4)
where T˜ is the lowest value of T such that θT > θm in equation (A.1). At
µ = θ∗, θL = θH = θ
∗ and θT = θ
∗ for all T . It follows that the function
θ (µ) is continuous at θ∗ since both equations above yield:
θ (θ∗) = µ0
(
1− δ + δ
(
θm
θ∗
)α−1
1− δ + δ
(
θm
θ∗
)α
)
(A.5)
Appendix A.2.2. Equilibrium Existence
A steady state equilibrium is a fixed point of the function θ (µ) de-
fined in Appendix A.2.1. We have already established that the function
is continuous on [θm,∞). Let us show in addition that θ (θm) > θm and
limµ→∞
θ(µ)
µ < 1.
If µ = θm, no firm below θ
∗ finds it profitable to export, as national
reputation imposes a first-period loss on all firms. Some firms with high
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enough θ have a positive NPV of future profits and enter. So since θm is the
lower bound of the prior quality distribution, θ (θm) > θ
∗ > θm.
As µ→∞, it remains profitable for all firms to stay active, so firms of all
qualities continue exporting until hit by the exogenous shock: T (θ)→∞ for
all θ. Therefore, limµ→∞ θ (µ) = µ0 which is finite, so limµ→∞
θ(µ)
µ = 0 < 1.
By the fixed point theorem, we have established that θ (.) has at least
one fixed point on [θm,∞).
Appendix A.2.3. Existence Condition for a High Quality Equilibrium
A HQE is a steady state equilibrium with equilibrium reputation above
θ∗. Therefore a sufficient condition for the existence of a HQE is θ (θ∗) > θ∗
in (A.5). We then prove that this is also a necessary condition and that if
there exists at least one HQE, there is only one HQE.
Let us show that θ (µ) is strictly decreasing in µ on [θ∗,∞). We can
rewrite (A.4) as: θ (µ) = µ0
(
1+K(α−1)
1+K(α)
)
where K (α) ≡
∑
∞
T=T˜
δT
(
θm
θT
)α
.
It follows that ∂K(α)∂α =
∑
∞
T=T˜
δT ln (θm/θT )
(
θm
θT
)α
< 0.
Consider a positive change in one of the thresholds, θS , leaving un-
changed all other thresholds. Then all else equal, average quality rises:
∂θ
∂θS
=
δS
θS
(
θm
θS
)α−1 [
α
(
θm
θS
)
(1 +K (α− 1))− (α− 1) (1 +K (α))
]
=
δS
θS
(
θm
θS
)α−1
(1 +K (α))
[
α
(
θm
θS
)
θ
µ0
− (α− 1)
]
=
δS
θS
(
θm
θS
)α−1
(1 +K (α)) (α− 1)
[(
θ
θS
)
− 1
]
> 0
where the positive sign derives from θ > θ∗ > θS for all S in a HQE. An
increase in µ lowers all θT given Assumptions 1 and 2 and differentiating:
∂θT
∂µ = −
1−ρ(T )
ρ(T )−w < 0. Thus, in a HQE, θ (µ) is a decreasing function:
∂θ
∂µ
=
∞∑
T=T˜
∂θ
∂θT
∂θT
∂µ
< 0
We have proved that θ (.) is strictly and continuously decreasing in µ on
[θ∗,∞). It follows that θ (.) has at most one fixed point on [θ∗,∞). Hence
θ (θ∗) > θ∗ is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a HQE,
and if this condition is satisfied, there is only one HQE.
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Lastly, we express the condition for θ (θ∗) > θ∗ as a function of funda-
mental parameters. At µ = θ∗, pit (θ) < 0 for all t > 1 and θ < θ
∗. Then:
θ (θ∗) =
∫ θ∗
θm
θdG(θ)+ 1
1−δ
∫
∞
θ∗
θdG(θ)
∫ θ∗
θm
dG(θ)+ 1
1−δ
∫
∞
θ∗
dG(θ)
= µ0
(
1−δ+δ( θmθ∗ )
α−1
1−δ+δ( θmθ∗ )
α
)
. So θ (θ∗) > θ∗ is
equivalent to µ0
(
1−δ+δ
(
θm(1−w)
k
)α−1
1−δ+δ
(
θm(1−w)
k
)α
)
> k1−w , which after substituting for
the value of µ0 and rearranging yields the following condition for the exis-
tence of a HQE:
α
(
θm (1− w)
k
)
+
δ
1− δ
(
θm (1− w)
k
)α
> α− 1
Conversely, there is no HQE and there is at least one LQE iff:
α
(
θm (1− w)
k
)
+
δ
1− δ
(
θm (1− w)
k
)α
< α− 1
Appendix A.2.4. Multiple Equilibria
While there cannot be more than one HQE, we show that the non-
monotonicity of θ (.) on [θm, θ
∗] creates the possibility of multiple equilibria.
A LQE is a fixed point of θ (µ) given by (A.3) on [θm, θ
∗]. On this interval,
we can show that the sign of ∂θ(µ)∂µ is indeterminate. Differentiating with
respect to each threshold:
∂θ
∂θL
=
µo (α− 1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α
(
1
θL
)(
θm
θL
)α−1 [
1−
θ
θL
]
< 0
∂θ
∂θH
=
1
1−δµo (α− 1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α
(
1
θH
)(
θm
θH
)α−1 [ θ
θH
− 1
]
< 0
∂θ
∂µ
=
∂θ
∂θL
∂θL
∂µ
+
∂θ
∂θH
∂θH
∂µ
=
µo (α− 1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α × ...
... ×
[(
θα−1m
θαL
) [
θ
θL
− 1
] (
1
w
)
− 11−δ
(
θα−1m
θαH
) [
1− θθH
] (
1−Aρ
Aρ−w
)]
∂θ
∂µ
< 0 iff
1
1− δ
(
1
θH
)α [
1−
θ
θH
](
1−Aρ
Aρ − w
)
>
(
1
θL
)α [ θ
θL
− 1
](
1
w
)
This condition can be rewritten as: δ > 1−
(
θL
θH
)α+1 (
θH−θ
θ−θL
)(
(1−Aρ)w
Aρ−w
)
.
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Then note that the bracketed terms are θLθH =
(µ−k)(Aρ−w)
w(k−(1−Aρ)µ)
and θH−θ
θ−θL
=
k−(1−Aρ)µ
Aρ−w
−θ
θ−µ−k
w
= wAρ−w
(
1−
Aρ(θ−µ)
k−µ+wθ
)
. Therefore θ (µ) decreases in µ when:
δ > 1−
(
µ− k
k − (1−Aρ)µ
)α+1(Aρ − w
w
)α−1(
1−
Aρ
(
θ − µ
)
k − µ+ wθ
)
and increases in µ otherwise. The reason why θ (µ) needs not be monotonic
over [θm, θ
∗] is that µ has opposite effects on θ coming from θL and θH .
Which effect dominates depends on the position of µ as well as the shape
parameter α and the survival parameter δ. This non-monotonicity is what
gives rises to the possibility of multiple equilibria.
To sum up, we have shown that if condition (13) holds, there is one HQE
(and there may be zero or a positive number of LQEs). If condition (13)
does not hold, there is no HQE and there is at least one LQE.
Appendix A.3. Proof of Proposition 3: Equilibrium Stability
Suppose µS is a steady-state LQE such that
∂θ(µ)/µ
∂µ < 0 at µS . We will
show that µS is a stable equilibrium for η < 1. Let us define θL,S ≡
µS−k
w and
θH,S ≡
k−(1−Aρ)µS
Aρ−w
. At time t − 1 the economy is in an initial steady-state
where µS = θ (µS) as given by (12).
Assume there is a perturbation at time t such that µt = µS + ε, ε > 0
and ε is small. For all µ ∈ (µS , µS + ε), θ (µ) < µ. The entry thresholds at
t are:
θL,t =
µt − k
w
=
µS + ε− k
w
θH,t =
k − (1− δ)
∑
∞
u=0 (1− ρ (u))µt+u
Aρ − w
where θH,t is determined by the zero intertemporal profits condition
∞∑
u=0
δu [(ρ (u)− w) θH,t + (1− ρ (u))Etµt+u − k]
and the absence of aggregate uncertainty allows us to remove the expecta-
tions operator.
Let us conjecture, to be verified, that µS ≤ µt+u+1 < µt+u < µS + ε for
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all u ≥ 1. Then for all u ≥ 1:
θL,S ≤ θL,t+u+1 < θL,t+u < θL,t
θH,S ≥ θH,t+u+1 > θH,t+u > θH,t
The average quality of exports is determined by the θL and θH thresholds
in the periods after the shock in the following manner: for u ≥ 0,
θt+u = µ0


1−
(
θm
θL,t+u
)α−1
+
u∑
l=0
δu−l
(
θm
θH,t+l
)α−1
+
∞∑
l=u+1
δl
(
θm
θH,S
)α−1
1−
(
θm
θL,t+u
)α
+
u∑
l=0
δu−l
(
θm
θH,t+l
)α
+
∞∑
l=u+1
δl
(
θm
θH,S
)α


θL,t+u =
µt+u − k
w
θH,t+u =
k − (1− δ)
∑
∞
l=0 (1− ρ (l))µt+u+l
Aρ − w
At time t, let us define θ
perm
t as the average quality that would prevail if
firms expected the shock to be permanent, i.e. if Etµt+u = µt for all u ≥ 0.
We calculate:
θt = µ0

1−
(
θm
θL,t
)α−1
+
(
θm
θH,t
)α−1
+ δ1−δ
(
θm
θH,S
)α−1
1−
(
θm
θL,t
)α
+
(
θm
θH,t
)α
+ δ1−δ
(
θm
θH,S
)α


θt < θ
perm
t = µ0


1−
(
θm
θL,t
)α−1
+
(
θm
θpermH,t
)α−1
+ δ1−δ
(
θm
θH,S
)α−1
1−
(
θm
θL,t
)α
+
(
θm
θpermH,t
)α
+ δ1−δ
(
θm
θH,S
)α


as θpermH,t =
k−(1−Aρ)(µS+ε)
Aρ−w
< θH,t from the conjecture µS ≤ µt+u+1 < µt+u <
µS + ε for all u ≥ 1. Also, we know that θ
perm
t < θ (µS + ε) < µt. The first
inequality results from θH,S > θ
perm
H,t . The second inequality comes from
θ (µ) < µ for µ ∈ (µS , µS + ε). Hence θt < µt and therefore µt+1 = µt +
η
(
θt − µt
)
< µt. Additionally as long as η is not too close to 1, µt+1 > µS .
We can show, similarly, that in all subsequent periods, θt+u < µt+u as
long as µt+u > µS . Thus µt+u+1 < µt+u for all u and the conjecture that
µt+u follows a decreasing path from µS + ε to µS is verified. In case of a
negative shock to µ at time t starting from a steady state where ∂θ(µ)/µ∂µ < 0,
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the proof is identical with opposite signs. It follows that if µS is a steady-
state LQE reputation and ∂θ(µ)/µ∂µ < 0 at µS , then µS is stable.
By the same reasoning, if µU is a steady-state LQE and
∂θ(µ)/µ
∂µ > 0 at
µU , then µU is unstable. Suppose there is a negative shock to µ starting
from µU = θ (µU ). Let us denote by µS the equilibrium of rank immediately
preceding µU . Further define θL,U ≡
µU−k
w , θH,U ≡
k−(1−Aρ)µU
Aρ−w
, θL,S ≡
µS−k
w
and θH,S ≡
k−(1−Aρ)µS
Aρ−w
. At time t, µt = µU−ε, where ε > 0 and ε small. We
conjecture µS ≤ µt+u+1 < µt+u < µU − ε, which implies θL,S ≤ θL,t+u+1 <
θL,t+u < θL,U and θH,S ≥ θH,t+u+1 > θH,t+u > θH,U for all u ≥ 0. Then
θt+u < µt+u and thus µt+u+1 < µt+u for all u ≥ 0 as long as µt+u > µS .
It follows that the economy converges to the steady-state equilibrium of
immediately lower (or higher in the case of a positive shock) rank where
θ (µ) crosses the 45-degree line from above.
Lastly, the stability of a HQE is derived from a similar proof. Suppose
that µQ is the initial steady-state HQE. We know from Appendix A.2.4
that ∂θ(µ)/µ∂µ < 0 at µQ. Let us define θT,Q ≡ max
{
k−[1−ρ(T )]µQ
ρ(T )−w , θm
}
for all
T ≥ 1. Assume there is a perturbation at time t such that µt = µQ + ε,
where ε > 0 and ε small.
We conjecture that µQ ≤ µt+u+1 < µt+u < µQ + ε. Then at time t+ u,
firms having already exported for T periods exit if their quality parameter
is below θT,t+u given by θT,t+u ≡ max
{
k−[1−ρ(T )]µt+u
ρ(T )−w , θm
}
for all T ≥ 1.
It follows that θT,Q ≤ θT,t+u+1 < θT,t+u < θT,t for all T and u ≥ 1. As in
the stable LQE case, we can define θ
perm
t as the average quality that would
prevail at t if the shock was expected to be permanent. It is straightforward
that θt < θ
perm
t < θ (µQ + ε) < µt, from which it follows that µt+1 < µt.
The same reasoning applies to show more generally that µt+u+1 < µt+u for
all u as long as µt+u > µQ. Therefore µQ is stable.
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Appendix A.4. Proof of Proposition 4: Export Subsidies
Appendix A.4.1. Low-Quality Equilibrium
In a LQE, average quality is given by (A.3). With ∂θ∂θL and
∂θ
∂θH
derived
in Appendix A.2.4, we obtain:
∂θ
∂k
=
∂θ
∂θL
∂θL
∂k
+
∂θ
∂θH
∂θH
∂k
=
µo (α− 1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α × ...
×
[
1
1−δ
(
1
θH
)(
θm
θH
)α−1 (
1− θθH
)(
1
Aρ−w
)
−
(
1
θL
)(
θm
θL
)α−1 (
θ
θL
− 1
) (
1
w
)]
∂θ
∂k
> 0 iff
1
1− δ
(
1
θH
)α(
1−
θ
θH
)(
1
Aρ − w
)
>
(
1
θL
)α( θ
θL
− 1
)(
1
w
)
This condition can be rewritten as δ > 1 −
(
θL
θH
)α+1 (
θH−θ
θ−θL
)(
w
Aρ−w
)
.
Note that, starting from a steady-state (θ = µ), the bracketed terms are
θL
θH
=
(µ−k)(Aρ−w)
w(k−(1−Aρ)µ)
and θH−θ
θ−θL
=
1
Aρ−w
(k−(1−w)µ)
1
w
(k−(1−w)µ)
= wAρ−w .
Therefore θ decreases in k if and only if
δ > 1−
(
µ− k
k − [1−Aρ]µ
)α+1(Aρ − w
w
)α−1
The RHS is decreasing in µ and α, so this holds for δ not too low, α
not too high and an initial µ not too low. Then starting from a LQE, a
decrease in k moves up the θ (µ) function left of the initial µ. The new
steady-state equilibrium quality and reputation are necessarily higher. If
the steady-state is unique, the new steady-state has higher µ. If there are
multiple steady-states, ranked by increasing µ, either the new steady-state
has the same rank and higher µ, or the new steady-state has higher rank
and higher µ.
The welfare effect of a subsidy σ (σ = −dk) has three components. First,
for firms with θ parameters such that they sell both without and with the
subsidy, the policy adds to their profits the amount it costs to the govern-
ment, plus the extra profits brought by a higher reputation µ′ > µ. The
total effect is unambiguously positive.
Second, for new exporters that enter around θL because of the policy
37
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
(θL < θ < θL′), the net benefit NBL of the subsidy is positive:
NBL =
∫ θL′
θL
(
µ′ − wθ − k + σ
)
dG (θ)−
∫ θL′
θL
σg (θ) dθ
=
(
µ′ − k
) ∫ θL′
θL
g (θ) dθ − w
∫ θL′
θL
θdG (θ)
=
[(
µ′ − k
) ((
θm
θL
)α
−
(
θm
θL′
)α)
− w αα−1θm
((
θm
θL
)α−1
−
(
θm
θL′
)α−1)]
= wθm
[(
θL′
θL
(
θm
θL
)α−1
−
(
θm
θL′
)α−1)
− αα−1
((
θm
θL
)α−1
−
(
θm
θL′
)α−1)]
> wθmα−1
((
θm
θL
)α−1
−
(
θm
θL′
)α−1)
> 0
where we go from the second to the third line using wθL′ = µ
′ − k.
Third, for new exporters that enter around θH because of the policy
(θH′ < θ < θH), the net benefit NBH of the subsidy is also positive:
NBH =
∫ θH
θH′
(
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
ρ (t) θ + (1− ρ (t))µ′ − wθ − k + σ
))
g (θ) dθ − ...
... 11−δ
∫ θH
θH′
σg (θ) dθ
= 11−δ
∫ θH
θH′
(
(Aρ − w) θ + (1−Aρ)µ
′ − k
)
g (θ) dθ
= 11−δ
[
−
(
k − (1−Aρ)µ
′
) ((
θm
θH′
)α
−
(
θm
θH
)α)
+
α(Aρ−w)
α−1 θm
((
θm
θH′
)α−1
−
(
θm
θH
)α−1)]
= 11−δ (Aρ − w) θm
[((
θm
θH′
)α−1
−
θH′
θH
(
θm
θH
)α−1)
− αα−1
((
θm
θH′
)α−1
−
(
θm
θH
)α−1)]
> 11−δ (Aρ − w)
θm
α−1
((
θm
θH′
)α−1
−
(
θm
θH
)α−1)
> 0
So the overall welfare gain is positive.
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Appendix A.4.2. High-Quality Equilibrium
In a HQE, average quality is given by (A.4). Using the derivations in
the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain:
∂θT
∂k
=
1
ρ (T )− w
> 0 for all T > T˜
∂θ
∂k
=
∞∑
T=T˜
∂θ
∂θT
∂θT
∂k
> 0
Hence a subsidy that lowers k shifts down the θ (µ) function. As θ is de-
creasing in µ in the HQE region, the new steady-state equilibrium defined by
θ (µ) = µ necessarily has lower µ. So average quality and national reputation
are higher in the HQE steady-state without subsidies than with subsidies.
Appendix A.5. Proof of Proposition 5: Tax/Subsidy Scheme
In this section, we show that the age-dependent tax/subsidy in Proposi-
tion 5 sustains a steady-state equilibrium which replicates the perfect infor-
mation entry and exit patterns by quality level. First, all per-period profits,
and therefore all entry or exit decisions, depend on µ, which is itself affected
by the policy. If the tax/subsidy scheme induces decisions identical to the
perfect information setting, then firms below θ∗ never enter and firms above
θ∗ always enter and stay. The resulting average quality and steady-state
reputation would therefore be: θ (µ) = µ =
∫
∞
θ∗ θdG (θ) =
α
α−1θ
∗.
Second, let us show that with µ = αα−1θ
∗ and taxes and subsidies set as
in Proposition 5, firms below θ∗ choose never to enter. In the first export
period, profits are decreasing in θ. To show that no firm below θ∗ can
profitably enter as fly-by-night and exit after one period, it suffices that
a firm of quality θm cannot do so. For firm θm, first-period profits are
pit+1 (θm) = µ−k−wθm−τ1 =
α
α−1θ
∗−k−wθm−
[
α
α−1
(
k
1−w
)
− k − wθm
]
=
0.
Hence no firm can realize strictly positive first period profits. However,
if subsidies are offered in later periods, it could still be the case that some
firms below θ∗ have an incentive to enter and pay the initial tax in order
to benefit from subsidies in later periods. The tax/subsidy combination for
s ≥ 2 ensures that this is not the case. The expected per-period profit of a
continuing exporter is, for s ≥ 2:
Etpit+s (θ) = [ρ (s− 1)− w] θ + [1− ρ (s− 1)]
α
α− 1
θ∗ − k − τs
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Among low-quality firms, this expression is the highest for firms of qual-
ity just below θ∗. Then the definition of θ∗ yields:
Etpit+s (θ
∗) = θ∗ − k − wθ∗ +
(
1− δ
δ
)(
τ1 −
1
α− 1
k
1− w
)
=
(
1− δ
δ
)(
τ1 −
1
α− 1
θ∗
)
=
(
1− δ
δ
)
(θ∗ − wθm) > 0
Hence if firm θ∗ enters, it incurs a loss in the first period and positive
profits thereafter. It follows that it never exits voluntarily and its intertem-
poral expected profits are:
Et
∞∑
s=1
δs−1pit+s (θ
∗) = pit+1 (θ
∗) +
∞∑
s=2
δs−1
(
1− δ
δ
)(
τ1 −
1
α− 1
θ∗
)
=
α
α− 1
θ∗ − k − wθ∗ − τ1 + τ1 −
1
α− 1
θ∗ = θ∗ − k − wθ∗ = 0
Since the after-tax, after-subsidy profits of continuing exporters are in-
creasing in θ, it follows that firms below θ∗ realize negative intertemporal
profits regardless of their exit date and never enter.
Third, by the same token, all firms above θ∗ have initially negative
profits but a positive net present value of their profit stream, and have
no incentive to exit voluntarily. Finally, note that τs can be rewritten as
τs =
(
1−ρ(s−1)
α−1
)
θ∗ − 1−δδ (θ
∗ − k − wθm) where the second term is nega-
tive. τ1 is positive and given Assumption 1, τs is decreasing in s, τ2 may be
positive or negative, and τs negative for s large enough.
Appendix A.6. Minimum Quality Standard
Let us assume a minimum quality standard θQS = θ
∗, such that all the
firms with θ < θ∗ choose not to enter the export market. Thanks to this
minimum quality standard, an economy initially in a stable LQE will move
to a HQE. In this HQE, all the firms of quality θ > θ∗ will export. Then
the average quality of exports across quality levels and cohorts of firms is
θt =
∫
∞
θ∗
θNt(θ)dθ∫
∞
θ∗
Nt(θ)dθ
, where the total number of active firms of quality θ is given
by Nt (θ) =
1
1−δg (θ). Simple calculations give us θ (µ) =
α
α−1θ
∗.
Let us call µinit the initial steady-state reputation µ (before the minimum
quality standard), and define θL,init ≡
µinit−k
w and θH,S ≡
k−(1−Aρ)µinit
Aρ−w
. The
welfare effect of the minimum quality standard for the exporting country
has three components. First, for firms with quality θ < θL,init, the effect is
40
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
unambiguously negative: these firms were exporting as fly-by-night before
the introduction of the minimum standard making positive profits. With
the minimum quality standard, they cannot enter the export market. In
the initial LQE, the total number of active firms of quality θ < θL,init was
g (θ) and given that these firms exported just for one period, their profit was
µinit −wθ − k. Hence the lost profits due to the minimum quality standard
are given by:
Loss θ<θL,init =
∫ θL,init
θm
(µinit − wθ − k) dG (θ)
= (µinit − k)
∫ θL
θm
g (θ) dθ − w
∫ θL,init
θm
θdG (θ)
= (µinit − k)
(
1−
(
θm
θL,init
)α)
− w
α
α− 1
θm
(
1−
(
θm
θL,init
)α−1)
= wθm
[
θL,init
θm
−
α
α− 1
+
1
α− 1
(
θm
θL,init
)α−1]
Second, for firms with quality θ∗ < θ < θH,init, the effect is unambigu-
ously positive: these firms were not exporting before the introduction of the
minimum standard. With the minimum quality standard, they now enter
the export market and export and stay until they are hit by the exit shock.
The value of their profit stream is positive and the gain is given by:
Gain θ∗<θ<θH,init =
∫ θH,init
θ∗
(
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
ρ (t) θ + (1− ρ (t))
(
α
α−1θ
∗
)
− wθ − k
))
g (θ) dθ
= 11−δ
∫ θH,init
θ∗
(
(Aρ − w) θ + (1−Aρ)
(
α
α−1θ
∗
)
− k
)
g (θ) dθ
= 11−δ
[
−
(
k − (1−Aρ)
α
α−1θ
∗
)((
θm
θ∗
)α
−
(
θm
θH,init
)α)
+
α(Aρ−w)
α−1 θm
((
θm
θ∗
)α−1
−
(
θm
θH,init
)α−1)]
= θm(1−δ)(α−1)
[
(1− w)
(
θm
θ∗
)α−1
− αθH,init
(
k
α + (1−Aρ) (θ
∗ − µinit)
) (
θm
θH,init
)α−1]
= 1(1−δ)(α−1)
[
k
(
θm
θ∗
)α
− (k + α (1−Aρ) (θ
∗ − µinit))
(
θm
θH,init
)α]
Third, for firms with quality θ > θH,init, the effect is also unambiguously
positive: these firms receive extra profits brought by a higher reputation
(from µinit to
α
α−1θ
∗). For a given reputation µ, the aggregate profit of firms
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with quality θ > θH is given by:
∫
∞
θH
(
∞∑
t=0
δt (ρ (t) θ + (1− ρ (t))µ− wθ − k)
)
g (θ) dθ
= 11−δ
∫
∞
θH
((Aρ − w) θ + (1−Aρ)µ− k) g (θ) dθ
= 11−δ
[
− (k − (1−Aρ)µ)
(
θm
θH
)α
+
α(Aρ−w)
α−1 θm
(
θm
θH
)α−1]
= 11−δ
[
−k + (1−Aρ)µ+
α(Aρ−w)
α−1 θH
] (
θm
θH
)α
Hence the gain from the higher reputation is given by:
Gain θ>θH,init =
(
α
α−1θ
∗ − µinit
)
(1−Aρ)
(
θm
θH,init
)α
Overall, the total welfare effect of a minimum quality standard is:
(
α
α−1θ
∗ − µinit
)
(1−Aρ)
(
θm
θH,init
)α
+ 1(1−δ)(α−1)
[
k
(
θm
θ∗
)α
− (k + α (1−Aρ) (θ
∗ − µinit))
(
θm
θH,init
)α]
− wθm
[
θL,init
θm
−
α
α− 1
+
1
α− 1
(
θm
θL,init
)α−1]
From simple computations (derivatives of the lost profits terms Loss θ<θL,init
with respect to various parameters), we obtain that the lower α (the shape
parameter of the distribution), the lower the loss from the minimum quality
standard. Intuitively, a low α means that there are more firms at the right
tail of the distribution, and so relatively less firms that lose from the stan-
dard. The lost profits due to the minimum quality standard also decrease
with the costs (w and k) (remember that θLinit =
µinit−k
w ). On the contrary,
they increase with the initial reputation (before the standard); the higher
the reputation, the higher the profits the fly-by-night firms were able to
extract when they exported for one period.
Appendix B. Informed and Uninformed Buyers
Suppose the population of importers is divided intoN equal-sized groups.
There is perfect information diffusion within groups but no information dif-
fusion across groups. Thus, if any individual in group n has previously
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consumed the output of firm j, then all buyers in group n are informed
about good j. When firm j is matched with buyer i, i is informed if there
exists iprime ∈ n such that i′ has been matched with j in the past, and
i ∈ Uninformed if there is no i′ ∈ n such that i′ has been matched with j in
the past. Further assume that the firm observes in any period whether its
buyer is informed or not, but not which group the buyer belongs to; hence
it does not know the exact proportion of informed buyers in any period but
only its expectation.
It follows immediately from this setup that ρ (0) = 0. After the firm
has exported for one period, one group is informed, so ρ (1) = 1N . For each
subsequent period, if the fraction of informed buyers after s export periods
is ρ (s), then with probability ρ (s), the firm is matched with a buyer in an
informed group, and the proportion of informed importers stays at ρ (s) for
the next period. With probability 1−ρ (s), the firm is matched with a buyer
in an uniformed group; then the fraction of informed importers next period
is ρ (s) + 1N .
Therefore, the expected fraction of informed buyers is given by the fol-
lowing path: for s ≥ 0,
ρ (0) = 0
ρ (s+ 1) = ρ (s)2 + (1− ρ (s))
(
ρ (s) +
1
N
)
= ρ (s)
(
N − 1
N
)
+
1
N
We can check that this function satisfies Assumption 1.
ρ (s+ 1)− ρ (s) =
1
N
(1− ρ (s)) > 0
ρ (s+ 1)− ρ (s)
ρ (s)
=
1
N
(
1
ρ (s)
− 1
)
is decreasing in s
lim
s→∞
ρ (s) =
1
N
(
1−
N − 1
N
)
−1
= 1
So ρ (s) is increasing in s, rises with s at a falling rate, and converges to 1.
Appendix C. Path of Prices for a Given Cohort of Firms
In this Appendix, we characterize the path of prices for a given cohort of
firms. At the firm level, there is a “brand premium” for high-quality firms
both in a HQE and in a LQE: the price charged increases over time for
a given good provided that its quality is higher than the country average.
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Result 1 establishes that on average, incumbents receive higher prices than
entrants, and the average price among a cohort of firms is higher, the longer
the cohort has been active on export markets. This result follows from the
fact that over time, an increasing fraction of prices reflect firms’ true quality
parameters, and the average quality of a cohort of firms weakly increases
over time as the lowest quality firms exit.
Result 1 (Unit Prices).
In a steady-state low-quality equilibrium, the average unit price charged
at t+ s by firms born at date t is strictly increasing in s.
In a steady-state high-quality equilibrium, the average unit price charged
at t+s by firms born at date t is strictly increasing in s for all s if µ > αα−1θ1
and for s ≥ T
(
α−1
α µ
)
otherwise.
Proof. In a LQE, the set of continuing firms is [θH ,∞) from the second
period onwards, so the average price plqet,t+s of cohort t at time t+ s is:
plqet,t+s
(
θ
)
=
{
θ if s = 1
θ + ρ (s)
(
α
α−1θH − θ
)
if s > 1
As θ < θH in a LQE and ρ (s) increases in s, it immediately follows that
plqet,t+s increases with s.
In a HQE, the set of active firms of cohort t at time t + s is [θs−1,∞),
and their average price is:
phqet,t+s
(
θ
)
=
{
θ if s = 1
θ + ρ (s)
(
α
α−1θs−1 − θ
)
if s > 1
ρ (s) and θs−1 increase with s. Immediately following the entry of cohort t,
phqet,t+s may fall with s if the distribution of θ has low variance (α high), such
that αα−1θ1 > µ. In this case, there is initially a large mass of firms at the
bottom of the distribution of continuing firms and their prices are falling.
However, since µ < αα−1θ
∗, there is some finite s′ such that for all s ≥ s′,
phqet,t+s+1
(
θ
)
> phqet,t+s
(
θ
)
and thus at each given point in time, the average
unit price is higher for older cohorts of firms.
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Under asymmetric information about quality, country reputation affects demand for imported goods. 
We obtain two types of steady states: high-quality and low-quality equilibria. 
With endogenous reputations, countries may be stuck in low-quality traps (e.g. China). 
Export subsidies improve welfare in countries with bad reputation, and decrease it otherwise. 
There is a tax/subsidy path based on export experience that replicates the perfect information outcome. 
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